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Amendment "vagueness" claim38 against the vileness factor. As applied
in the Virginia capital scheme, the constitutionality of the vileness factor
is one of the last and most promising issues not yet expressly ruled upon
Accordingly, a defendant is denied due process when the Common-
wealth fails to produce a narrowing construction for the vileness factor
which is both comprehensible to the jury and specific enough so that the
defense may proceed with preparation of its case. See, e.g., Clark, 201
Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 (1979) (capital defendant in Virginia can not
rely on vileness as having one specific meaning and seek to defend
himself on those grounds).
38 In addition to the clarity required in order to give defendant an
opportunity to defend against an eligibility factor, the jury is entitled to
by the United States Supreme Court. Contact the Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse for assistance in litigating these issues.
Summary and analysis by:
Jody M. Bieber
be instructed in language that has a commonsense core of meaning. Not
all purportedly narrowing constructions have been found sufficient to
meet this requirement. See, e.g., Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990)
(The limiting construction of the Mississippi "vileness" factor was
unconstitutionally vague. The construction could be construed by
sensible jurors to characterize nearly all murders. Therefore, discrimina-
tive and individualized imposition of the death penalty was not attainable
by applying the indiscriminate limiting construction.).
McFARLAND v. SCOTT
114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
The State of Texas convicted Frank Basil McFarland of capital
murder and sentenced him to death on November 13, 1989. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmedl and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 2 Subsequently, the trial court set McFarland's
execution for September 23, 1993.
McFarland, desiring to initiate a state habeas corpus proceeding,
moved the trial court to stay or withdraw his execution date so that the
Texas Resource Center would have time to find counsel for the proceed-
ing. Texas contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction to stay the
execution since McFarland had not filed an application for a writ of
habeas corpus. Though declining to appoint counsel for McFarland, the
trial court moved the execution date to October 27, 1993.
3
The Texas Resource Center could not obtain counsel forMcFarland
and on October 16, 1993 asked the court to appoint counsel. The trial
court declined to do so and further refused to modify the execution date,
deciding that McFarland was not entitled to appointment of counsel for
state habeas corpus proceedings in Texas.4 The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals subsequently denied McFarland's pro se motion requesting a
stay and remand for appointment of counsel.
5
1 McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
2 McFarland v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2937 (1993).
3 McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568, 2570 (1994).
4 McFarland, 114 S. Ct. at 2570.
5 Id.
6 McFarland relied on 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B)(q) (1988):
In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255
of title 28 seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any
defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain
adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other rea-
On October 22, 1993, McFarland filed a pro se motion to obtain
federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. He also requested appointment of counsel
6
and a stay of execution to allow time for that attorney to file a federal
habeas corpus petition. The District Court denied the motion on October
25, 1993. 7 Concluding that McFarland's claim had not triggered a"post
conviction proceeding" under the federal habeas corpus statute, 8 that
court decided that McFarland was therefore not entitled to appointment
of counsel and that the District Court had no jurisdiction to enter a stay.
The District Court also denied a certificate of probable cause to appeal. 9
Meanwhile, a federal magistrate judge had found an attorney for
McFarland. The magistrate judge suggested the attorney file a cursory
petition for writ of habeas corpus so that the District Court might appoint
the attorney and grant McFarland a stay. The attorney did so, but the
District Courtheld the petition insufficient and also denied the motion for
stay.10
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also denied McFarland's appli-
cation for a stay on October 26, 1993, the day before his scheduled
execution. 11 That court decided that although federal courts could stay
sonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment
of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other
services in accordance with paragraphs (5), (6), (7), (8), and
(9).
7 McFarland, 114 S. Ct. at 2571.
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255 (1988).
9 McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. at 2571.
10 McFarland v. Collins, 7 F.3d 47 (5th Cir. 1993).
11 Id.
Page 12 - Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1
executions while habeas proceedings were "pending," no habeas pro-
ceeding was "pending" in McFarland's case because he had not yet filed
a petition.12 The Fifth Circuit's denial of stay on October 26 left
McFarland without a stay and without a petition.
On October 27, 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay
pending decision on certiorari. 13 The Court later granted certiorari.
14
HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's judgment, holding
that capital defendants may invoke their statutory right to federal habeas
proceedings by filing a motion to request appointment of habeas counsel,
and that federal courts have jurisdiction to enter stays whenever neces-
sary to effectuate that right.
15
ANALYSISIAPPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Supreme Court's decision clarified a capital defendant's right
to counsel during federal habeas proceedings. Capital defendants may
now obtain counsel for federal habeas proceedings before filing their
federal habeas petition simply by filing a motion to request appointment
of such counsel with the United States District Court. Further, such
courts may now enter stays of execution to effectuate the defendant's
right to counsel to prepare the habeas petition.
16
To understand the necessity of this decision itmustbeplaced within
the larger framework of right to counsel decisions concerning all stages
of capital cases. In McCleskey v. Zant17 the Supreme Court held that
federal habeas corpus petitioners must include every claim in the original
habeas petition, effectively meaning that federal courts should dismiss as
"successive and abusive" any subsequent petition raising a new claim.t 8
Under this standard capital defendants must ensure that their original
habeas petition contains all contemplated claims; otherwise, federal
courts will dismiss these claims.
The initial federal petition is thus, in all but the rarest instances, the
capital defendant's only chance for federal habeas relief. The impor-
12 Id.
13 McFarland v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 374 (1993).
14 McFarland v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
15 McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. at 2574. Justice O'Connor filed
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. While agreeing that
21 U.S.C. § 848 guaranteed a capital defendant the right to an attorney's
assistance in preparing a federal habeas petition, and that practically
speaking, federal courts shouldhave thepower to enterstays to effectuate
that right, Justice O'Connor nonetheless concluded that28 U.S.C. §2251
did not allow federal courts to stay executions before counsel's prepara-
tion of a federal habeas petition. Id. at 2574-76. Justice Thomas filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
joined. Justice Thomas concluded that a capital defendant had to file a
habeas petition to trigger his entitlement to counsel, since both 21 U.S.C.
§ 848 and 28 U.S.C. § 2251 contemplated entitlement to counsel only
when a habeas proceeding had commenced. Justice Thomas further
opined that such proceedings "commence" only when the petition has
already been filed. Id. at 2576-81.
16 McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. at 2571.
17 499 U.S. 467 (1991). See case summary of McCleskey, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 7 (1991).
tance of ensuring its accuracy and adequacy becomes paramount. With-
out assistance of counsel the petitioner could either fail to state a federal
claim or omit claims. His right to a federal habeas proceeding, and his
statutory right to counsel at that proceeding, would be rendered meaning-
less. McCleskey therefore effectively requires a right to counsel before
filing a federal habeas petition if access to federal habeas proceedings is
to be at all meaningful.
McFarland was facing an important change in Texas practice.
Formerly, capital defendants had been able to obtain counsel by filing a
perfunctory petition. Counsel would thereafter flesh out the document.
Texas would not seek dismissal of the "amended" petition for abuse of
the writ under the McCleskey doctrine and under Federal Habeas Rule 9.
However, a capital defendant had filed such a petition in Gosch v.
Collins,19 one month before McFarland's scheduled execution. The
District Court denied petitioner Gosch a stay and also dismissed the
petition on the merits.2 0 The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 21 When Gosch later
filed an adequate petition, the District Court dismissed it as "successive
and abusive."22
Virginia practice differs from the Texas practices facing McFarland
in several respects. It is the Commonwealth's practice to acquiesce in
appointment of counsel for state habeas proceedings. The Common-
wealth began this practice after the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Murray v. Giarratano,2 3 where the Court decided that the
Constitution did not require that states appoint counsel to indigent capital
defendants for state habeas corpus proceedings. Justice Kennedy con-
curred in the 5-4 judgment. He decided that the Court was ill-equipped
to promulgate rules for right to counsel at state habeas proceedings,
which task properly belonged to state legislatures. He also noted,
however, that Virginia capital defendants had never been unable to
obtain counsel for collateral proceedings. 24 Most likely out of concern
for Justice Kennedy's position and to avoid future problems at state
habeas, the Commonwealth routinely agrees to the appointment of
counsel for capital state habeas proceedings.
Thus, while the right to counsel is constitutionally required only at
trial and on direct appeal, 25 it is Virginia practice to appoint counsel at
18 Id.
19 Gosch v. Collins, No. SA-93-CA-731, 1993 WL 484624 (W.D.
Tex., Sept. 15, 1993).
20 Id.
21 Gosch v. Collins, 8 F.3d 20 (5th Cir. 1993).
22 Gosch v. Collins, No. SA-93-CA-736 (W.D. Tex., Oct. 12,
1993).
23 492 U.S. 1 (1989). See case summary of Murray, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 8 (1989).
24 Murray, 492 U.S. at 14-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
25 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment
requires counsel at trial); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (if a state
provides direct appeal, the right to counsel attaches). There is no right,
however, to counsel to petition the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari-either after the direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, or after state or federal habeas proceedings. This was suggested
inMurray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), and Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551 (1987). Both these decisions dealt with whether access to
courts requires the right to counsel at collateral proceedings, but never
mentioned the possibility of right to counsel at the Supreme Court level,
either on direct appeal or on appeal from collateral proceedings.
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state habeas proceedings in the trial court and on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Virginia. The right to counsel at federal habeas proceedings is
statutory. 26 Additionally, although the right to counsel does exist at most
stages of capital litigation, the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel does not. That right applies only at trial and on
direct appeal, where its basis is constitutional. It does not apply to state
or federal habeas corpus proceedings. 27
There is no statutory time limit in Virginia to file state or federal
habeas proceedings. However, the Commonwealth often petitions
courts to set execution dates when it feels the defense is delaying the
filing of a state habeas corpus petition too long. After such action, or in
lieu of it, the Commonwealth and the defense will usually agree on when
the defendant must file the petition. Regarding federal petitions, Justice
Blackmun noted for the majority in McFarland that federal courts could
26 28 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2254, 2255 (1988).
27 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,752-53 (1991). See case
summary of Coleman, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. l,p. 4 (1991).
exercise their discretion against granting stays if a "dilatory" capital
defendant squandered the time available to obtain counsel to prepare the
habeas corpus petition.
28
Unlike Texas, Virginia generally does not seek oppressively
quick execution dates for capital defendants. But attorneys for capital
defendants should take fullest advantage of the time before state habeas
proceedings must be instituted to reinvestigate their case. It is also
important that defense counsel agree on a deadline for filing a federal
habeas petition, so that counsel will have as much time as possible to
investigate important issues for appeal. Examples include withholding
of exculpatory evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
which require investigation outside the trial record.
29
Summary and analysis by:
Gregory J. Weinig
28 McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. at 2573.
29 See Hobart, State Habeas in Virginia: A Critical Transition,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 23 (1990).
ROMANO v. OKLAHOMA
114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On the morning of July 19, 1986, John Joseph Romano and David
Wayne Woodruff brutally murdered and robbed Romano's friend and
former gambling boss Lloyd Thompson.1 Tried as co-defendants,
Romano and Woodruff were convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death. They immediately appealed to the Court of Criminal
Appeals requesting relief on the basis of irreconcilable defenses.2 While
this appeal was pending, Romano stood trial for a separate and earlier
capital murder charge arising out of events in October 1985.
On October 16, 1985, Roger Sarfaty was found murdered and
robbed in his apartment.3 The State sought the death penalty against
Romano, charging murder in the first degree and robbery with a danger-
ous weapon. Romano was convicted. During the sentencing phase of the
trial, the State sought to prove four aggravating circumstances including
that the defendant had previously been convicted of a violent felony and
would constitute a continuing threat to society. In an attempt to prove the
past and future dangerousness of defendant, the State introduced, over
the objections of the defense, a copy of the judgment and sentence from
the Thompson murder conviction. The document revealed that the
defendant had been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.
It also showed that defendant intended to appeal the outcome.
1 Woodruff v. State, 825 P.2d 273 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
2 Id. at 274.
3 Romano v. State, 847 P.2d 368, 373 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
4 Id.
5 Romano v. State, 827 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992)
The jury found the existence of all four aggravating circumstances
and recommended death for the murder conviction and one thousand
years imprisonment for the robbery conviction. The trial court sentenced
accordingly and Romano appealed. 4 While the appeal in this case was
pending, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma overturned the
conviction for the Thompson murder, holding that Romano's trial should
have been severed from that ofWoodruff. The Thompson judgment was
reversed and remanded for a new trial.5
Given this sequence of events, Romano argued on his Sarfaty
appeal that the trial court erred when it admitted the documentation of the
Thompson conviction and sentence. Romano asserted it was improper
to admit the conviction because it was not final at the time of admission
and had since been overturned. Furthermore, he argued, the sentence
impermissibly reduced the jury's sense of responsibility for its decision
under the Eighth Amendment and rendered the sentencing determination
so unreliable as to amount to a denial of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
6
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding
that although theevidence oftheThompson sentencewas irrelevant, the
(Romano was tried a second time for the 1985 Thompson murder and was
again found guilty of first degree murder and robbery and sentenced to
death.).
6 Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004,2007 (1994).
